Correct by Construction Security Approach to Design Fault Tolerant Smart Homes for Disabled People  by Guillet, Sébastien et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  21 ( 2013 )  257 – 264 
1877-0509 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.09.034 
ScienceDirect
The 4th International Conference on Emerging Ubiquitous Systems and Pervasive
Networks (EUSPN-2013)
Correct by construction security approach to design fault
tolerant smart homes for disabled people
Se´bastien GUILLET∗, Bruno BOUCHARD, Abdenour BOUZOUANE,
Abstract
Smart homes dedicated to people with disabilities, specially those with dementia, are critical systems which need
to remain safe and adapted to the user. However the control part of these systems, that is ensuring their safety, is
both diﬃcult to design as well as to verify without appropriate tools. Formal techniques have been used to cope with
the veriﬁcation problem, but this paper proposes a new way to specify smart home safety which also eases the design
aspect. It enables the use of a correct by construction technique – Discrete Controller Synthesis – to automatically build
from constraints a maximally permissive safety controller.
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1. Introduction
Ubiquitous computing, making us more connected to our environment and other people, is challenging
the way we live through many diﬀerent means, ranging from anticipating our needs to securing our environ-
ment and automating routine physical tasks. Contributions to ubiquitous computing has lead the scientiﬁc
community to the smart home era [1], which involves a wide range of these means to liberate us from usu-
ally hard and repetitive work at home and to help us live more independently. Enhancing independence is
actually the core concept of smart homes dedicated to disabled people. For example, such a house can be
designed to help a human resident suﬀering from a cognitive deﬁcit to complete his activities of daily living
(ADL) [2] without the need of additional human assistance. Designing this kind of smart homes involves
many challenges, including blending unobtrusively into the home environment [3], recognizing the ongoing
inhabitant activity [4], localizing objects [5], adapting assistance to the person’s cognitive deﬁcit [6], and
securing the environment [7]. Given the high degree of vulnerability of people with cognitive deﬁciencies,
securing the house is a primary concern. Indeed, an adequately designed smart home for disabled people
should be able to provide both assistance and protection. However, even if a smart home system is usually
build to last, it might no be the case for its very own components [8]: lights, screens, sound system, and
many other important equipments can fail during the lifetime of the system. In this context, providing a
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viable security strategy over time requires to take failures into account due to their high probability and
potential harmful consequences if not taken seriously [9]. To operate properly over time, the main concern
of a fault tolerant smart home system is, upon detection of a failure, knowing how to ”react appropriately”.
Let’s suppose that a detected random failure aﬀects an arbitrary component, is the system still able to pro-
vide both protection and adequate assistance with respect to the person’s disabilities ? Answering such
a question usually requires to solve a non-trivial combinatorial problem: a smart home is supposed to be
composed of many dynamical components (electrical shutters, lights, ventilation systems, etc.), each one
having several exclusive execution modes (opening, opened, on, oﬀ, disabled, failed, etc.) which can be
observed using sensors; These components are concurrently executed and their execution modes can be in-
ﬂuenced upon reception of events which can be external to the system (e.g. the user pushes a button) and/or
internal (e.g. a security system prevents a hair dryer from powering on because it is too hot). Here lies
the complexity: ensuring that the system will respect a security property (e.g. being able to provide assis-
tance even if a component fails) requires to verify that this property holds for each accessible combination
of execution modes. Now let’s introduce the notion of controllability, which happens when a component
oﬀers an interface so that a control system – a program named controller – can send events to constrain
its behavior. Controllability is very common in the context of ubiquitous computing – smart home is no
exception – where almost every component provides such an interface so that it can be adapted to a situa-
tion. A system is said to be controllable with respect to a temporal property whether given its dynamicity
and controllability, it exists a controller able to constrain the system such that the temporal property holds
for all possible executions. Applied to smart homes for disabled people, a smart home has the capacity to
undertake a security constraint1 over time if and only if a control system can be proven to keep the system
in execution modes complying with the constraint. But even if a system under control can be proven correct
using veriﬁcation techniques, its controller is not guaranteed to be interesting. For example, let’s take a
controllable component which can be prevented to start, and a security constraint such that this component
must not be started when temperature is above 50◦ C; now let’s build a controller which always disables
this component; then the system under control can be veriﬁed to be correct, however we understand that
the implemented controller should be more permissive when temperature is lower than 50◦ C. Basically, in
presence of controllability, the designer of a fault tolerant smart home system has to face two non-trivial
problems: building a permissive controller and verifying the system under control. It happens that these two
problems are the specialty of a formal technique named Discrete Controller Synthesis (DCS) [10]: given a
system’s dynamicity, controllability, and temporal constraints, if a control solution exists then DCS is able to
provide automatically a controller which is both correct by construction and maximally permissive, meaning
that it valuates control events tied to control interfaces of dynamic components only when the system has to
be constrained. The contribution of this study relies on the deﬁnition of a model to represent a smart home
system dedicated to disabled people, and the use of DCS to automatically prove its security and provide
adaptation orders in a permissive manner.
2. Related work
The literature on which this study is based can be divided into three majors domains. The ﬁrst one is
smart home modeling [11, 7, 12]: this work aims to give a framework to represent key aspects of a smart
home (dynamicity, controllability, and temporal constraints) so that formal techniques such as DCS can be
applied; these aspects are generic and need concrete deﬁnitions for the smart home context. The second
domain is smart home security [13, 9, 14, 15] what makes a smart home secure, especially a smart home
for disabled people ? What are the techniques employed to provide some form of security in this context ?
Finally, the third domain is formal techniques [16, 17, 18]: failing to provide a correct smart home behavior
for all its possible executions could have harmful consequence for a vulnerable inhabitant, so how do we
prove a smart home to be secure ? What is the best technique to apply given the smart home properties ?
1Or, to be more general, a ”quality of service constraint”.
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2.1. Smart home modeling
Research projects related to modeling of smart homes for disabled people usually share many concepts
based on representing: the smart home elements (devices, doors, lights, etc.) with their positions and
execution modes, the person itself (its state of mind, behavior, position, cognitive proﬁle, etc.), and the
global execution model (how the smart home is supposed to run and process events in order to provide both
assistance and security using artiﬁcial intelligence). In [7] and [11], Pigot et al. present respectively 1) a
metamodel containing generic knowledge of a smart home system for elders suﬀering from dementia and
2) a corresponding model showing cognitive assistance and telemonitoring concepts. These works detail a
pervasive infrastructure and applications to provide assistance to elders with cognitive deﬁciencies using two
kinds of interventions: one operating inside the home to help the person to complete its activities of daily
living (ADL) in case of diﬃculties, and another one establishing communication outside the home to send
message to caregivers, medical teams or families. In [12], Latﬁ et al. give an overview of an ontology-based
model of a smart home dedicated to elderly in loss of cognitive autonomy. The ontological architecture
is partitioned into seven sub-domains: Habitat, Person, Equipment, Software, Observable Tasks, Behavior,
and Decision (adaptation). These works constitute the foundation of section 4, which will show how to
represent their ideas into a formal synchronous model, so that security properties can be set and veriﬁed.
2.2. Smart home security
Due to its importance, security in the context of smart homes – especially those dedicated to disabled
people – has been widely covered in the literature. Failures in a smart home system may occur on several
levels [13, 9]: a smart home is typically a set of hardware and software components communicating together,
so failures can happen either at hardware, software or communication level. Sensors, actuators, displays,
speakers, lights, etc. are traditional failure-prone smart home hardware components. They wear over time,
can be damaged, can go down if they are battery powered, can cease to communicate because of limited
signal strength, can operate incorrectly because of a manufacturing defect, etc. A single failure at this level
can compromise the smart home security. A smart home system also typically contains multiple software
components running together (operating systems, artiﬁcial intelligences, controllers, etc.), including com-
mercial applications (i.e. trusted black boxes). Unless formally checked against security requirements, few
assumption should be made about applications. Even software veriﬁed by competent and credible experts
can contain bugs. The malfunction of the control software in Ariane 5 Flight 501 is an example of such an
bug, which remained undetected through several human-driven veriﬁcation processes [19]. Communication
between hardware and software components happens through wired and wireless channels. Communication
failures are mainly caused by low signal strength (e.g. two mobile wireless devices communicating together
get separated by a too long distance) or heavy traﬃc. They are not really hardware or software related,
but can be (wrongly) perceived as such because aﬀected components cease to communicate and become
unavailable, making these failures important to detect. When a hardware, software or communication com-
ponent failure is detected, two common responses are 1) using an equivalent component (redundancy) [14]
and 2) executing the system in a degraded mode, allowing it to work correctly through failures using a safe
subset of its functionalities [15]. These methods will be used in Sections 4 and 5 as a base to build a fault
tolerant smart home. Now proving that the smart home system can still provide adequate assistance in case
of a failure of some of its components, for every possible execution, every context, etc. is essentially a
combinatorial explosion problem that is very diﬃcult to solve without appropriate tools.
2.3. Formal methods
Many research work contribute to formal modeling and veriﬁcation of users interactions, hardware/soft-
ware components and control algorithms in the smart home domain [16] [17] [18]. However, formal veriﬁ-
cation supposes that a complete system can be modeled before being applied. In the modeling methodology
proposed in [18], a modeling step named ”control algorithm modeling” is explicitly required. This step is
about the deﬁnition of a module which, given 1) the system current conﬁguration, 2) incoming message
from the system or its environment, and 3) control rules, makes a reconﬁguration decision and sends trig-
gering messages to the associated devices for performing the required operations. This step is precisely the
part that is diﬃcult to design because of the combinatorial problem we are facing in this context. This is
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the reason why we are more interested into an alternative method, DCS, which is able to both build the con-
trol part automatically and perform formal veriﬁcation of the system. DCS has already been successfully
applied in virtual contexts such as adaptive resource management [20], reconﬁgurable component-based
systems [21] and reconﬁgurable embedded systems [22]. However, it has been shown that when brought
into a physical context, eg. task management in non-reliable architectures [23], DCS should be performed
on a model containing fault tolerance assumptions to be realistic. Using DCS to provide formal controllers
for a physical environnement such as a smart home is no exception and requires to make assumptions on
the reliability of its components. For example, proving that an adequate prompting message (video, sound,
light signal, ...) will always be played when a person makes a mistake in an activity is useless in practice if
we do not consider the fact that home components carrying these messages (TV, light bulbs, ...) usually fail
at some point and get repaired or replaced. This is why this contribution takes fault tolerance into account
to prove DCS useful in the smart home context. A smart home system can be considered as a specialization
of autonomic computing systems [24], which adapt and reconﬁgure themselves through the presence of a
feedback loop. This loop takes inputs from the environment (e.g. sensors), updates a representation (e.g.
Petri nets, automata) of the system under control, and decides to reconﬁgure the system if necessary. This
consideration is detailed in Section 3. Describing such a feedback loop can be done in terms of a DCS
problem. It consists in considering on the one hand, the set of possible behaviors of a discrete event system
[25], where variables are partitioned into uncontrollable and controllable ones. The uncontrollable variables
typically come from the system’s environment (i.e. ”inputs”), while the values of the controllable variables
are given by the synthesized controller itself. On the other hand, it requires a speciﬁcation of a control objec-
tive: a property typically concerning reachability or invariance of a state space subset. Such a programming
makes use of reconﬁguration policy by logical contract. Namely, speciﬁcations with contracts amount to
specify declaratively the control objective, and to have an automaton describing possible behaviors, rather
than writing down the complete correct control solution. The basic case is that of contracts on logical prop-
erties i.e., involving only boolean conditions on states and events. Within the synchronous approach [26],
DCS has been deﬁned and implemented as a tool integrated with synchronous languages: Sigali [27]. It
handles transition systems with the multi-event labels typical of the synchronous approach, and features
weight functions mechanisms to introduce some quantitative information and perform optimal DCS. One of
the synchronous languages it has been integrated with is BZR [28], which is used in this work; BZR actually
includes a DCS usage from Sigali within its compilation. The compilation yields (if it exists) the code of a
correct-by-construction controller, which can itself be compiled to be executed into the smart home system.
Based on the synchronous characteristics of a smart home system, Section 3 sets the synchronous context
and notations so that they can be applied to smart home modeling in order to perform DCS.
3. Synchronous framework
Synchronous languages are optimized for programming reactive systems, i.e. systems that react to ex-
ternal events. This section aims at presenting the similarities between a reactive system under control and
a controlled smart home, so that a synchronous framework gets justiﬁed as appropriate to specify smart
home systems. In [22], the execution model of a reactive system under control is depicted, cf. Figure 1.
Such a system contains a global execution loop, which starts by taking events from the environment. Then
these events get processed by a task (Reconﬁguration controller), which chooses the system’s conﬁguration.
Finally, this conﬁguration order gets dispatched through the system’s tasks following its model of computa-
tion, and another iteration of the loop can start again. If a system can be represented within this execution
model, then the proposition of this work can help to design and formally obtain its Reconﬁguration con-
troller task. In [14], guidelines to build the software architecture of a smart home system are presented,
cf. Figure 2. Such a software follows a loop-based execution, in which a database containing an updated
system state and event values is read and processed by eventual artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) modules to trans-
form raw data into high level information. This information can then be used by third party applications.
Immediately, we can see similarities arising from such an architecture compared to the reactive system exe-
cution model. If we add a reconﬁguration controller as a third party application in this software architecture,
then we obtain the same execution principle presented in Figure 1: in each iteration of the execution loop
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Fig. 1. Conﬁguration processing ﬂowchart Fig. 2. Smart home software architecture
a controller can be designed to 1) take events and/or high level information provided by the system and its
environment, 2) perform a reconﬁguration decision, and 3) give this decision back to the system using some
of its actuators (i.e. its controllability) before the next iteration. Designing the aforementioned controller
by constraint so that it can be obtained automatically through DCS becomes possible, but it requires the use
of formal a model to specify the behavior of the underlying system. Behavioral modeling can be performed
using various formal representations, e.g. Statecharts, Petri-nets, Communicating Sequential Processes, etc.
The toolset we use in this work – BZR and Sigali – brings us to deﬁne our system in terms of synchronous
equations and automata or Labelled Transition Systems (LTS), following the principles given in [22].
4. Smart home model
From the various smart home presentations found in the related work, a smart home system for people
with disabilities can be abstracted as a hierarchy of hardware and software components (dynamic or not),
sensors, and eﬀectors distributed among several interconnected rooms, helping a person with impairments
to perform ADL. This section shows how to specify all these features within a synchronous model.
4.1. Dynamic components
The top component of the hierarchy is the system itself. In accordance to the synchronous execution
model, let’s suppose we want to control a system deﬁned as an LTS, taking inputs I from its eﬀectors
(buttons, touchscreens, controllable interfaces, etc.) and producing outputs O from its sensors (low level
sensors, AI, any device producing notiﬁcations, etc.) each time it is triggered. The smart home system is
node LightBulb
¬switch
switch
Off On
switch:bool
Fig. 3. Simple light bulb model
node LightBulb
¬switch
switch ⋀ lighIsOn
Off On
lightIsOn:bool
switch:bool
Fig. 4. Observable light bulb
node LightBulb
¬lightIsOn
lightIsOn¬switch
switch ⋀ lighIsOn
switch ⋀ ¬lighIsOn
Off
failed=false
Fail
failed=true
On
failed=false
¬switch
lightIsOn:bool
failed:boolswitch:bool
Fig. 5. Light bulb failure model
usually built upon several components, which can in turn be deﬁned as LTS or LTS compositions if they are
dynamic (i.e. they have multiple exclusive running modes) or as a set of synchronous equations if they have
only one execution mode. Some components may be redundant and should not be speciﬁed more than once.
For this case, BZR provides a node construct, in which LTS and synchronous equations can be deﬁned to be
instantiated. Figure 3 shows the graphical representation of such a node for a light bulb behavior deﬁnition.
Representing or not a component must be decided upon the following principle: if a component is concerned
by a security rule, or if it can directly or indirectly inﬂuence a component concerned by a security rule, its
behavior must be deﬁned in the synchronous model. Moreover, if a behavior is modeled, it must also be
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observable. Regarding the example of the light bulb from ﬁgure 3, if its corresponding switch is set to ON
or OFF 2, then the bulb is supposed to respectively light up or shut down. This abstraction can work for a
system with a relatively short life and built with new light bulbs. However, in the context of smart homes,
a light bulb may fail at some point. In this model, the light bulb failure is not observable, so it does not
correspond to reality. Being able to observe such a failure requires another component, like an appropriate
sensor represented in Figure 4 by the boolean variable lightIsOn. To keep track of the failure, it can be
represented as an execution mode, cf. Figure 5.
4.2. Person
Any person interaction with the system can be observed through its various types of sensors. However, in
the very speciﬁc context of smart homes for disabled people, some characteristics of the person’s behaviors
and impairments can also inﬂuence security rules, and thus, have to be both observable and represented in
the synchronous model. As shown in the related literature, usual observable properties about a person are its
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Fig. 6. Position model
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Fig. 7. ADL ”Make Coﬀee”
node Disabilities
deaf = true;
blind = false;
GDSAPD = 7;
Fig. 8. Impairement model
position, mood, ADL and impairments. Position can be trivially deﬁned as a LTS depending on how rooms
are interconnected in the house. Let’s suppose there are three rooms: a kitchen, connected to a bathroom and
a bedroom. If sensors can determine the current position of a person, then the position evolution over time
can be modeled by the LTS shown in Figure 6. Observable behaviors in a smart home system are usually
deﬁned as a set of scenarios containing multiple steps and conditions to go from a step to another, so as to be
processed by AI – in combination of events coming from the system – which can infer which step of which
scenario the person is currently doing. Such a representation for scenarios makes them easy to be deﬁned
as LTS. And because a scenario can be aborted at any time by the person, modeling a scenario can follow
the same principles presented for the observable failure of the light bulb. Figure 7 shows a LTS example
representing the act of making coﬀee, evolving from step to step using AI notiﬁcations. Finally, mood and
impairments are usually represented by boolean or numerical attributes, so they can be represented using
synchronous equations. Evaluation of impairments for example, can come from various assessments such as
the Global Deterioration Scale for Assessment of Primary Degenerative Dementia (GDSAPD) [29] which
allocates a number between 1 and 7 depending on the cognitive decline (7 being very severe). We could
also add additional disabilities such as ”blind” or ”deaf” which can be associated to booleans, cf. Figure
8. Using all these speciﬁcations, a smart home model can be completed by speciﬁc properties required by
DSC, namely: designation of controllability within the model, and security constraints deﬁnition.
5. Applying DCS
When the various components and properties of a system are deﬁned as behavior models (LTS, etc.) and
synchronous equations, setting both the controllability and execution constraints enables the use of DCS.
2The state of the switch is itself supposed to be known by the system
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Controllability occurs naturally in the smart home domain. In the synchronous model, inputs are re-
ceived each time the system is triggered, and these can come from both the environment – uncontrollable
inputs IU (e.g. a button is pressed by a human) – and the system itself – controllable inputs IC (e.g. a
device is forced to shut down by control system which is part of the execution loop). For example, let’s take
node Controller
Contract
   assume(¬(fail1 ⋀ fail2))
   enforce(¬(problem) ⋁ light1 ⋁ light2)
   with(c1,c2)
fail1 = LightBulb(switch1,c1,lightIsOn1);
fail2 = LightBulb(switch2,c2,lightIsOn2);
problem:bool
lightIsOn1:bool
lightIsOn2:bool
switch1:bool
switch2:bool c1:bool
c1:bool
node LightBulb
¬lightIsOn
lightIsOn¬switch ⋀ c
switch ⋀ lighIsOn ⋁ c
switch ⋀ ¬lighIsOn
Off
failed=false
Fail
failed=true
On
failed=false
¬switch
lightIsOn:bool
failed:bool
c:bool
switch:bool
Fig. 9. Controllable light bulb model
a system allowing a third party application to control two failure-prone light bulbs so that they can be forced
to light up or remaining lit even if their switch is turned oﬀ by a human. Figure 9 represents the designed by
constraint controller of this small system, instantiating two times the LightBulb node (modiﬁed compared
to Figure 5 with a variable c representing the aforementioned controllability), which takes amongst others
the switches values as uncontrollable inputs switch1, switch2 ∈ IU and the values given by the third party
application as controllable inputs c1, c2 ∈ IC . The statement with, declaring controllable variables, is ac-
tually implemented in BZR, which also allows to declare security constraints so that these variables can be
valuated accordingly at each instant of the synchronous execution.
We consider two types of security constraints expressed as boolean synchronous expressions: 1) Hy-
pothesis, which are supposed to remain true for all executions, and 2) Guarantee, which are enforced to
remain true using controllable variables if and only if the Hypothesis stays true from the beginning of the
execution. For example, let’s say we want to be sure that, for all possible executions, at least one light bulb is
lit up if a problem (uncontrollable information coming from observation) arises: this can be speciﬁed using
the guarantee ¬problem ∨ light1 ∨ light2 (cf. enforce statement). However, the system is not controllable
with this rule alone: light bulbs can be in fail mode at the same time while the system receives a problem,
and thus the guarantee cannot be fulﬁlled for this speciﬁc execution. This situation would be found auto-
matically when applying DCS, which would fail to build a controller. Now, let’s say that the light bulbs can
still fail but are supposed to be repaired quickly enough so that they don’t fail at the same time. This is an
example of fault tolerance: ultimately everything can fail but if there is enough redundancy we can safely
state that not everything will fail at the same time. The hypothesis ¬( f ail1 ∧ f ail2) (cf. assume statement)
represents this assumption in a synchronous boolean expression. Applying DCS using the BZR toolset on
such a model gives back the C code of a controller taking IU as inputs and providing the computation of IC
as outputs so that the system can now be executed, receiving both IU and IC . DCS is able in this example to
ﬁnd automatically the correct controller code so that c1 and c2 can be valuated to true or f alse exactly when
they should (e.g. when a problem arises, and lights are oﬀ, and light1 has failed, then c2 will be forced to
false, etc.). From such a minimal example, we understand how DCS becomes interesting when the system’s
complexity increases while having to maintain its safety. If we add other failure-prone devices, impairment
models, security constraints, etc. both designing and verifying the maximally permissive controller quickly
start to be hard without appropriate tools.
6. Conclusion and perspectives
Safety and security services are essential requirements for many pervasive computing systems. Smart
homes, especially those dedicated to people with disabilities, represent a category of such systems where
safety is a very critical property. This is due to the fact that the person living in such a house is usually
frail and is not supposed to be able to cope with system errors: implication of failures can range from user
annoyance to hazardous situations.
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Correct adaptation behavior – so that the smart home remains safe whatever the conditions of execution
– is both diﬃcult to design and verify, and DCS has been proven useful by being able to design by contraints
correct adaptation controllers in such a non-reliable physical context.
The main advantage we envision from such an approach is that once a smart home system is deﬁned by
a designer, it can be adapted safely, automatically, and speciﬁcally to particular persons by expressing their
characteristics and applying DCS. However the current solution still needs improvements to be usable by
smart home designers. Knowledge of the synchronous framework, BZR, DCS, etc. is not expected from
them, so as a perspective, further work will be done about building a methodology around these concepts,
allowing designers to use their own tools to create speciﬁcations of controllable systems, which could be
automatically transformed into an equivalent representation in BZR, making DCS applicable.
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